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firms facing the threat of a potential entrant. Firms' dilemma is between occupying the
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goods that offer higher utilities hence can be charged a higher price to consumers but are also
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favour entry, as merging the networks and accommodating entry can be preferred by the
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Abstract
Consider an industry in which network goods are supplied by two horizontally
diﬀerentiated ﬁrms facing the threat of potential entry. Firms’ dilemma is between
occupying the product space by selling very diﬀerentiated (incompatible) goods,
and supplying compatible goods that oﬀer higher utilities – hence can be charged
a higher price to consumers – but are also closer substitutes. The compatibility-
entry-price game is solved backward when ﬁrms and consumers are located on a
circular product space. It turns out that strong externalities can favour entry, as
merging the networks and accommodating entry can be preferred by the incum-
bents to intense price competition between them: they choose the lesser of two
evils.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
There is a clear impression nowadays that networks are a central issue. Networks con-
nect individuals, communities, ﬁrms and structure the workings of society as a whole.
Users of speciﬁc goods and services are networked, so are members of common interest
groups, acquaintances and business relationships, ﬁrms operating in knowledge-intensive
industries willing to share costs and perform innovation more eﬃciently.1 An essential
motivation is that networks very often give rise to externalities. This is true for iso-
lated standards, and even more so when a common standard is achieved, as proprietary
networks merge and even larger externalities obtain. The current paper is about this
problem: the interconnection of networks via the provision of compatible goods.
The literature on compatibility falls within two broad categories. The “mix-and-
match” approach views products as systems made up with several distinct parts, and
focuses on changes in product variety and demand triggered by compatibility decisions.2
The second strand of literature, to which this paper belongs, assumes demand-side
economies of scale in the form of increasing returns to adoption: the value a consumer
derives from purchasing a good increases with its diﬀusion. Achieving compatibility
then permits users to reap the (larger) beneﬁts associated with the group of compati-
ble goods. Increasing returns to adoption stem from many sources, among which the
major ones probably are direct network externalities; the existence of complementary
goods or services (often referred to in the literature as indirect network externalities);
and learning-by-using/doing (Rosenberg 1982). Direct network externalities exist when
adopters’ beneﬁts directly increase with the sales or market share of compatible prod-
ucts: phones, fax machines, more generally communication technologies are of little
value in themselves, but they provide network access – the value of the network de-
termines that of the good.3 Indirect network externalities, by contrast, obtain via the
provision of complementary goods or services: cars have no value in the absence of parts,
gasoline and roads; so are compact disc players without compact discs, and computers
without software packages.4 Under both direct and indirect network externalities a sim-
ilar dilemma arises: on the one hand a ﬁrm that chooses to make its product compatible
increases the value of the product to the consumer, but on the other hand preserving
incompatibility increases market power.
The objective of the present paper is to formally address the eﬀect of direct net-
work externalities on entry. The model is derived from the circular address model of
1This is by no means speciﬁc to the “new” economy: see Puﬀert (1991) on railway gauge standard-
ization.
2The essential elements of the components approach can be found in Matutes and Regibeau (1988)
and Economides and Salop (1992).
3See the seminal paper by Katz and Shapiro (1985); de Palma and Leruth (1996) or Economides
and Flyer (1998) for compatibility-then-output games; de Palma and Leruth (1993) in a compatibility-
then-price approach; de Palma, Leruth and Regibeau (1999) for a converter analysis; two-period models
are in Farrell and Saloner (1985, 1986) and Katz and Shapiro (1986) with focus on consumers’ excess
inertia/momentum rather than compatibility per se; empirical analysis in Saloner and Shepard (1995)
on ATM adoption or Greenstein (1993) on government agencies hardware acquisition.
4See Cusumano et al. (1992) on the VHS/Betamax case in the early 1980s; Cottrell and Koput
(1998) on software availability and platform price in the early microcomputer industry (over the period
1980-86); Gandal et al. (2000) CD players and CD variety; Chou and Shy (1990, 1996) and Church and
Gandal (1992) provide models where the welfare of consumers is aﬀected by the variety of supporting
goods or services that a monopolistically competitive market supplies.
2Salop (1979). Two additional eﬀects are accounted for. First ﬁrms are eager to supply
compatible products for which consumers have a higher valuation – a contention which
several case-studies support (Gandal 1994; Harhoﬀ and Moch 1997 for instance). At the
same time, consumers perceive compatible products as closer substitutes which yields
increased price competition. Choosing to be compatible is renouncing some product dif-
ferentiation. We include the additional eﬀect of an increased competition arising from
the entry of an outside competitor. Depending on the importance of the loss relative
to the increased attractiveness of the product’s larger installed base, diﬀerent market
outcomes obtain. A particularly interesting one is when the losses in terms of diﬀer-
entiation are compensated by the network externality and entry is accommodated. A
new incompatible good penetrates the market because it has access to a wide enough
market niche granted by incumbent ﬁrms that prefer the additional value from merging
their networks to the preservation of monopoly power. A three stage game is examined,
in which incumbents make their standardization decisions before the potential entrant
makes his entry decision. In the last stage, active ﬁrms engage in price competition.
2T h e m o d e l
The compatibility-entry-price game considered here is a variant of Salop’s (1979) circle
model. Goods’ characteristics are distilled into an aggregate index located on a circular
address space. There are two mono-product ﬁrms i =1 ,2 characterized by a location
zi, ap r i c epi and a network size yi. Depending on the compatibility conﬁguration, the
network of a ﬁrm consists of either the ﬁrm’s own sales (when incompatibility prevails,
and then the two ﬁrms have diﬀerent networks) or the sum of the two ﬁrms’ sales (when
compatibility is established, and then 1 a n d2h a v eac o m m o nn e t w o r k ) . T h ep r e c i s e
formulation is given in Section 3. Each consumer (of which there is a continuum of
unit mass) is also located in the address space, at the point where his ‘ideal’ good
lies. Without loss of generality, the goods and consumers’ locations are described in a
clockwise manner starting from 12 o’clock. Marginal production cost is set equal to zero
for all ﬁrms. The indirect utility a consumer located at z derives from i is given by
Ui (z)=r − pi + wyi − |z − zi|, (1)
where r stands for the (supposedly large) income of the consumer, w>0 captures the
intensity of network externalities and the match value |z − zi| (the length of the geodesic
between consumer z and ﬁrm i) represents the dis-utility from buying a good that does
not exactly match the consumer’s taste.
We seek a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium in which incumbent ﬁrms ﬁrst choose
whether to be compatible or not (C or I), the potential entrant decides to enter or not
(e or ¯ e) ,a n dt h e na l lﬁrms set prices. In the ﬁrst stage, the incumbent ﬁrms can adopt
a common standard (which amounts to a compatibility decision) at the expense of some
amount of product diﬀerentiation, i.e. a change in their locations z1 and z2.F i r m s
producing incompatible goods locate at z1 =1 /4a n dz2 =3 /4. To represent the loss
of product diﬀerentiation induced by compatibil i t yi ti sa s s u m e dt h a tc o m p a t i b l eﬁrms
locate at z1 = h and z2 =1− h, with 1/4 <h<1/2, as in Figure 1. Compatible ﬁrms
oﬀer less diﬀerentiated products but larger networks.
It is worth insisting on the fact that there is no explicit address/location choice: the
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Figure 1: Incumbents locations in the product space
position for the ﬁrm’s product in the address space. Hence ﬁrms have no control over the
reduction in product diﬀerentiation that stems from adherence to a common standard. A
diﬀerent framework could be imagined in which ﬁrms would explicitly choose a position
on the circle, possibly combatting the losses in terms of product diﬀerentiation resulting
from compatibility. This is beyond the scope of this paper which takes ﬁrms’ locations
as only aﬀected by compatibility decisions. Hence there are two central parameters: the
loss in diﬀerentiation (as measured by h), and the strength of network externalities w.
The potential entrant e asks a price pe and has location ze = 0. A consumer z derives an
indirect utility of Ue (z)=r − pe + wye − |z − ze| from purchasing good e. The entrant
is incompatible with the installed ﬁrms regardless of their decisions (hence his network
always consists of its own sales). However, his niche is larger under the compatibility
regime (total mass going up to 2h>1/2, see Figure 1) and therefore installed ﬁrms face
a dilemma between occupying the product space to deter entry and merging networks
in order to raise prices. The potential entrant enters if and only if his expected proﬁts
are higher than the ﬁxed cost of entry f ≥ 0.
3 Price competition
Given standardization and entry decisions, we seek an equilibrium of the price sub-
game. The standard maneuver to solve this type of Hotelling-Salop model is to determine
indiﬀerent consumers, derive demand functions and solve the ﬁrst-order conditions under
all the possible compatibility and entry regimes. Two remarks are important. First it
will be assumed that no ﬁrm cuts prices so as to reap the totality of other ﬁrms demand
(for an instance in which undercutting is allowed see Kohlberg and Novshek 1995);
rather we only examine viable ﬁrms (as in Eaton and Wooders 1985 for instance) and
this simpliﬁes the calculations quite signiﬁcantly as the consumer indiﬀerent between
two ﬁrms is always between them. The second remark is that because there are network
externalities, demand addressed to the ﬁrms may not be deﬁned uniquely unless the
strength of externalities is constrained (see de Palma and Leruth 1993; Anderson et al.,
1992). As will be showed below, it is suﬃcient that w<1/2 for demand functions to be
decreasing in ﬁrms’ own prices. As a consequence equilibrium will be uniquely deﬁned.
Equilibrium outcomes are summarized in Table 1 under the two technical regimes, with
4and without entry.
Start with the determination of indiﬀerent consumers in the incompatibility regime
under the assumption that entry takes place.L e t zi,j denote the consumer indiﬀerent
between good i and good j, with i,j ∈ {1,2,e}. Assuming that ﬁrms are viable amounts
to assuming that zi,j always lies between i and j. In the incompatibility regimes networks
are proprietary with y1 = z1,2 − ze,1,y 2 = z2,e − z1,2 and ye = ze,1 +1− z2,e. Then the




−pe + w(ze,1 +1− z2,e) − ze,1 = −p1 + w(z1,2 − ze,1) − (1/4 − ze,1)
−p1 + w(z1,2 − ze,1) − (z1,2 − 1/4) = −p2 + w(z2,e − z1,2) − (3/4 − z1,2)
−p2 + w(z2,e − z1,2) − (z2,e − 3/4) = −pe + w(ze,1 +1− z2,e) − (1 − z2,e)
and yields
ze,1 =








4(pe − p2)+7− 10w
4(2− 3w)
.
Speciﬁcally ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt function under entry and incompatibility is p1 (z1,2 − ze,1)w i t h
ﬁrst derivative ∂π1/∂p1 = z1,2 − ze,1 − 2p1/(2 − 3w) and second derivative ∂2π1/∂p2
1 =
−4/(2 − 3w) < 0 which indicates that the proﬁtf u n c t i o no fﬁrm 1 is strictly quasi-
concave. A similar exercise yields the indiﬀerent consumers under compatibility. In the




−pe + w(ze,1 +1− z2,e) − ze,1 = −p1 + w(z2,e − ze,1) − (h − ze,1)
−p1 − (z1,2 − h)=−p2 − (1 − h − z1,2)
−p2 + w(z2,e − ze,1) − (z2,e − 1+h)=−pe + w(ze,1 +1− z2,e) − (1 − z2,e)
which yields
ze,1 =








pe − (1 − w)p2 − p1w +2− 3w − h
2(1− 2w)
.
From there the ﬁrst order condition for proﬁt maximization yields optimal prices and
equilibrium proﬁts in the symmetric equilibrium for ﬁrms 1 and 2. The upper part of
Table 1 provides equilibrium prices and proﬁts when entry takes place. Note that all
prices and proﬁts are positive for any 1/4 <h<1/2.
The second part is the determination of indiﬀerent consumers in the two possible
regimes under the assumption that entry does not take place. Consider incompatibility
ﬁrst. The system of equations satisﬁed by z1,2 and z2,1 is cumbersome to write down













(2 − 3w)(2− h − 3w)
2
2(5− 6w)














−2h − 1+3 hw +4 w − 3w2¢2
(5 − 6w)
2 (1 − 2w)
− f
No entry (¯ e)
p∗
1,2 1/2 − w 1/2
π∗
1,2 1/4 − w/21 /4
Table 1: Equilibrium prices and proﬁts in the compatibility and incompatibility regimes,
with and without entry
unless we shift ﬁrms’ locations to be z1 =0a n dz2 =1 /2 (this does not modify the
degree of diﬀerentiation). The system then is
½
−p1 + w(z1,2 +1− z2,1) − z1,2 = −p2 + w(z2,1 − z1,2) − (1/2 − z1,2)
−p2 + w(z2,1 − z1,2) − (z2,1 − 1/2) = −p1 + w(z1,2 +1− z2,1) − (1 − z2,1)
yielding
z1,2 =




2(p1 − p2)+3( 1− 2w)
4(1− 2w)
.
As for compatibility, similarly relocate ﬁrms at z1 =0a n dz2 =1− 2h. Externalities
cancel out (networks merge) and this time it should be the case that
½
−p1 − z1,2 = −p2 − (1 − 2h − z1,2)
−p2 − (z2,1 − 1+2 h)=−p1 − (1 − z2,1)
which entails
z1,2 =







In the lower part of Table 1 the equilibrium prices and proﬁta r ep r o v i d e df o rt h ec a s e
in which entry does not take place. When no entry takes place, ﬁrms can increase their
6proﬁts by making their products compatible: total demand is still equally split but prices
are higher. However, as can be seen from Table 1, this is not the case when entry takes
place. There it can be the case that compatibility entails a proﬁt loss.
Having determined the equilibrium of the last stage of the game, we now consider
the decisions of compatibility and entry.
4 Strategic compatibility and the decision to enter
Before entering the general case, assume there are no externalities: w =0 . Incumbents
only loose by making their products compatible because they broaden the niche for the
entrant without deriving any additional network beneﬁts. Setting w =0i nT a b l e1
yields incompatibility as a dominant strategy for the incumbents. The entrant then
assesses the beneﬁts from entering an incompatible market, πe (I,e)=9 /100−f. At the














Figure 2: The implicit solution to γh (w)=0 . (The entrant’s preferred market conﬁgu-
ration is in lower case letters.)
Consider now the case of positive externalities: w>0. Here several outcomes are
possible, depending on the values of the three parameters h,w and f.5 Deﬁne the
potential entrant’s net preference for compatibility to be γh (w)=πe(C,e) − πe (I,e),
with the corresponding proﬁts deﬁned in Table 1. In Figure 2 the implicit roots to
γh (w) = 0 are represented. The zone between the two curves is where the entrant
prefers entering an incompatible market, πe (C,e) < πe (I,e), whereas above and below
5This section has greatly beneﬁt t e df r o mt h ec o m m e n t so far e f e r e eo ft h eEconomics Bulletin.
7the two curves the preferred market conﬁguration of the entrant is a compatible market.
Depending on the magnitude of the ﬁxed entry cost f three subcases obtain, leading to
a total of 6 distinct parameter regions which we summarize in Table 2.
Incumbents Entrant
πe (C,e) − πe (I,e) < 0
small f πe (I,e) > πe (C,e) > 0
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
C if π∗




medium f πe (I,e) > 0 > πe (C,e) C¯ e
large f 0 > πe (I,e) > πe (C,e) C¯ e
πe (C,e) − πe (I,e) > 0








medium f πe (C,e) > 0 > πe (I,e)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
C if π∗
1,2 (C,e) > π∗
1,2 (I,¯ e),
I otherwise.
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
e if C,
¯ e otherwise.
large f 0 > πe (C,e) > πe (I,e) C¯ e
Table 2: Parameter regions and corresponding equilibrium outcome.
Three situations are easily dealt with: they are characterized by the absence of entry
due to relatively large ﬁxed costs.6 In the upper part of Table 2, where πe (C,e) <
πe (I,e), both large and medium (in the sense that is made explicit in the table) entry
costs lead to the equilibrium choice of compatibility for the incumbents and the decision
of staying out for the potential entrant. Similarly in the lower part of Table 2, where
πe (C,e) > πe (I,e), a large entry cost entails compatibility and the decision of staying
out.
A symmetric situation obtains for low entry costs such that entry always takes place.
An additional deﬁnition is required. Let ∆h (w)=π∗
1,2 (C,e) − π∗
1,2 (I,e)b et h ei n -
cumbents preference ¸ cfor compatibility under the assumption that entry always takes
place. Figure 3 depicts the roots to γh (w)=∆h (w)=0i nt h e( h,w)-space, and
the corresponding optimal compatibility decision. The thin black curves are the roots of
γh (w)=0 , while the thick black one corresponds to ∆h (w)=0 . The upper (respectively
lower) panel corresponds to the upper (respectively lower) part of Table 2.
From both panels it is clear that the critical value of w at which incumbents are indif-
ferent between compatibility and incompatibility (the root to ∆h (w)=0 )i si n c r e a s i n g
with h. Compatibility indeed has two major eﬀects on incumbents’ proﬁts: it relaxes
6It is useful to note that π∗
1,2 (C,¯ e)−π∗
1,2 (I,e)=1 /4−(7 − 10w)
























Figure 3: Small entry cost: upper panel corresponds to the upper part of Table 2;
lower panel corresponds to the lower part. (Upper case letters refer to the incumbents’
decision.)
9price competition by cancelling the multiplier eﬀect of w, but it weakens diﬀerentiation
and introduces an additional source of competition (the possible entrant). Hence the
stronger externalities are for a given value of h, the more likely it is that incumbents
prefer compatibility. This is what is visible from the two panels in Figure 3.
Probably the most interesting conﬁguration is the last subcase of the medium entry
costs case, when entry only takes place in a compatible market (second row, lower part
of Table 2). Deﬁne φh (w)=π∗
1,2 (C,e) − π∗
1,2 (I,¯ e) to be the incumbents preference for
compatibility under the assumption that entry only takes place in a compatible market.
Figure 4 depicts the roots to γh (w)=φh(w)=0i nt h e( h,w)-space. The black thin
curves stand for γh (w) = 0 while the implicit root of φh (w)=0i sd e p i c t e di nt h i c k
black. Here compatibility oﬀers a large market space to the entrant, while at the same
time externalities are suﬃcient for the incumbents to compensate the loss of product













Figure 4: The roots to γh (w)=φh(w)=0 . (Upper case letters refer to the incumbents’
decision, while entry only takes place on a compatible market.)
For any 1/4 <h<1/2, there are two zones in which we observe compatibility and
entry being systematically associated.7 The ﬁrst one is the central lens. It is bounded





=0 .37731 and arg{φh (w)=0 } =0 .45938. T h es e c o n dz o n ei si nt h e
u p p e rp a r to ft h eﬁgure, above the largest root to γh (w)=0 . It is characterized by
values of w larger than 0.46832, which is the root to γ1/4 (w)=0 .A sar e s u l t ,f o ra n y
7Though it is not readily visible from the graph, the upper curve only asymptotically approaches
1/2a sh approaches 1/2.
10h t h e r ei sa l w a y sa tl e a s to n eo p e ni n t e r v a lWh of w-values such that, provided w ∈ Wh,
equilibrium is characterized by incumbent ﬁrms choosing compatibility and entry taking
place. In both cases externalities have to be “large enough” to compensate for the loss of
product diﬀerentiation. Interestingly entry can take place when externalities are strong
rather than weak. So at ﬁrst glance it might seem that network externalities push for
entry, when typically large network eﬀects should rather discourage the outsider (this is
also the general argument about installed bases). However it should not be forgotten that
here competition is driven by prices rather than quantities, and so network externalities
and incompatibility entail an increased proclivity to cut prices. So the loss in product
diﬀerentiation, the threat of entry and the resultant increase in competition are real
when incumbents opt for compatibility, but because externalities are so strong they still
prefer avoiding the multiplier eﬀect of w on the ﬁerceness of competition. In that sense
they choose the lesser of two evils.
5C o n c l u s i o n
Several forces are at work when the decision to be compatible is considered. A com-
mon result when price competition takes place is that ﬁrms become compatible because
compatibility reduces the incentives ﬁrms have to undercut their rivals. This is unclear
when compatibility implies a loss in product diﬀerentiation, as the subsequent increase
in competition might oﬀset the beneﬁts from relaxing the multiplier eﬀect of network
externalities. The more intense network externalities, the less likely it is that we ob-
serve a desire to preserve incompatibility, unless compatible goods are extremely close
substitutes in which case the positivity of proﬁts is jeopardized. Another issue was em-
phasized in this paper. Compatible goods tend to leave wider unoccupied zones in the
address space, which not only strengthens price competition but also favors the entry of
an outside competitor in one of the leftover niches.
The ﬁxed structure assumed here imposes an immediate tension for the incumbents
between compatibility (hence higher proﬁts) and ease of entry for an outsider. If ﬁrms
where free to choose their locations (hence controlling the degree of diﬀerentiation in
order to possibly prevent entry) diﬀerent outcomes could obtain, and it is likely that an
outsider would not want to enter a compatible market in which he would face both large
network eﬀects and a better occupied product space.
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